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Abstract 
An important debate on the impact of digitization on diplomatic practice is currently taking 
place in most of the world’s diplomatic services and beyond. Western perspectives do 
however dominate writings on the subject and there is scope for importing new theoretical 
notions into these discussions. This article on digital diplomacy aims to show that South 
Korea’s practices harmonize well with insights from new media theory, and that both inform 
this debate. New media theory advocates the examination of the new digital environment in 
which diplomatic interactions are unfolding, and it articulates the politics behind digital 
technology. We argue that existing, “analogue” diplomacy is not merely superimposed onto 
technologies now shaping an environment that is facilitating digitally native practices. The 
debate on digital diplomacy can equally benefit from analysis of the experiences of South 
Korea. Technological development and innovation impact on the sphere of foreign policy, to 
the extent that “becoming technological” has turned into an important Korean export asset. 
We briefly review four ways in which South Korea applied technology to diplomacy. Our 
analysis concludes with general recommendations for diplomatic practitioners across the 
world, particularly those who still look at new technologies, including social media, as mere 
open and freely available “services”. 
Introduction 
This article aims to throw new light on the current debate concerning diplomacy in the 
digital age — digital diplomacy for short — by combining reflections inspired by literature on 
new media with an analysis of South Korean practice. As a high-tech economy aiming to 
invest in its network power to compensate for its geopolitical predicament, the Republic of 
Korea (ROK; hereafter South Korea) is in a good position to maximize the diplomatic 
potential of digital technology.  Following the Japanese example in various ways, South 
Korea largely rebuilt itself with the help of digital technology throughout the second half of 
the twentieth century (Mahlich and Pascha, 2012). It has promoted itself as a distinguished 
high-end, technologically advanced country among its partners in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Ok, 2011). 
 
 
South Korea’s practices as a digital middle power harmonize well with insights from new 
media theory. This article will show that, taken together, they add theoretical and non-
Western ingredients to the current global debate on digital diplomacy.[i][1] Existing literature 
on digital diplomacy often overlooks past and recent research originating from new media 
studies. The purpose of this article is to show how this field  can be beneficial to digital 
diplomacy. By giving preference to the contribution from this literature, we underline the 
importance of its research tradition when studying digital diplomacy. Following this 
introduction, we discuss how new media literature helps us look at the impact of digitization 
as an environment in which diplomacy is enacted. Digital diplomacy can be more than social 
media and other tools available for diplomats to use (Manor 2016). We aim to engage with 
some conceptions of digital diplomacy by examining the technical, yet no less political, 
properties of digital diplomacy today. In doing so, the analysis is a call for a critical 
examination of the political and diplomatic significance of digital technologies. 
  
In general terms, this review of selected aspects of South Korean digital diplomatic practice 
aims to contribute to our understanding of how diplomacy is adapting to the processes of 
digitization. In English-speaking literature, such discussions are usually dominated by an 
American and European intellectual framework, their institutional experience and that of 
other international actors (Yi & Melissen 2011; Melissen & Sohn 2015). Outside of this 
framework, the South Korean case can be of particular interest. Technology is at the heart 
of governmental efforts to brand this middle power.South Korean governments had already 
made indirect use of digital tools in the context of foreign policy by the mid-1980s (Oh & 
Larson 2011). As inferred during online research for this article, literature consultation and a 
range of interviews in Seoul, it does not make sense to conceive of American and European 
cases as examples.[ii][2] South Korea has undergone comprehensive digitization in a peculiar 
historical context, and so have multiple aspects of its foreign policy (Mahlich & Pascha 
2012).  
  
The article starts by discussing key notions on the impact of digitization from outside the 
field of diplomatic studies, followed by a discussion of what the “softwarization” of 
diplomacy means for its mediation capacity (for more on the notion of softwerization, see 
Berry, 2014; Bratton, 2016; Manovich, 2013a; Tufekci, 2014; Galloway and Thacker, 2004; 
Barreneche, 2012; Siegert and Winthrop-Young, 2015; and Kitchin and Dodge, 2011). We 
argue that it is important to articulate the politics behind digital diplomacy rather than just 
applying digital tools to existing practices, and to think of future practices by confronting the 
 
 
emerging reality of forms of diplomatic engagement in a digitized world (Bjola & Holmes 
2015).[iii][3] Turning to South Korea, the article analyses conditions facilitating its 
transformation into one of the world’s leading technological powers, plus the areas of digital 
diplomacy where we can identify its main strengths. We conclude by suggesting how 
debates on diplomacy today can learn from combining analyses of (new) media theory and 
practices of a political actor like South Korea. 
  
Diplomacy in a transformative digital environment 
The impact of digital technologies on diplomatic practice is codependent on our 
understanding of their nature when applied to social and political contexts. New media 
studies look at other aspects of such technologies than how social media can be successfully 
employed by national governments and other diplomatic actors.[iv][4] They resist regarding 
new technologies as open and freely available “services” for governments to use, but as a 
complex set of instruments designed by actors (e.g. Google or Facebook) to interact with 
others and systematise their interests in social, political and economic spheres. 
  
Neither practitioners nor pundits debating “digital diplomacy” can afford to ignore the 
underlying infrastructures of such technologies, such as algorithms and other encoded 
mechanisms. In a matter of years, new media have become ubiquitous access points to 
culture, politics and economic activities, having an exceptional mediatory capacity. Actors 
behind popular platforms have a powerful political impact in how they organize our access 
to information and capital today. How do digital technologies redesign people’s access and 
engagement with these processes? Just as Facebook may have redesigned much of social 
life, online infrastructures  may also have a role in redesigning international relations, 
political dialogue, cultural exchange and the conditions for the creation of new ideas in ways 
that are directly relevant to the very nature of  diplomacy. 
  
Reminiscent of references about “soft power” in the past 25 years, basic terminology in the 
digital diplomacy debate is used rather loosely. Participants in this debate often have little 
common understanding of what “digital” means, which is of course an important 
prerequisite for an informed discussion about its influence on diplomatic practice. This is 
where new media theory may come in to help students of diplomacy. In  debates on the 
impact of digitization on diplomacy, there is generally little reflection on the nature of new 
mediums in which diplomacy will increasingly be operating. The impact of numerical 
 
 
language in restructuring international relations and communication is, however, not an 
esoteric question. Digital platforms are progressively influential in the fields of culture and 
social relations, meaning that they are also of greater relevance to an increasingly 
“societized” diplomatic institution (Hayden 2012; Pamment 2013). The study of diplomacy 
needs to reflect on the depth and extent of digital technology as a new environment in 
which states and other international actors communicate and conduct relations. New media 
theorists could, in turn, benefit from a better sociopolitical understanding of digital media: 
everything “digital” changes the game of diplomacy in the international sphere and of 
relations between a government and society at home. 
  
Digital technologies should also be recognized as a source of creativity for diplomats. They 
can be more than simply using devices and services such as email, Twitter or Facebook. 
Their relevance comes above all from their transformative capacities, rather than from their 
convenience (Lister, 2009, p.87). In a sense, these new technologies “digitize” workplaces, 
to the extent that they render objects manageable, collectible and reusable data (Kitchin, 
2014; Berry, 2014). Big powers, small non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and, 
indeed, diplomatic actors of any kind can employ programming languages as tools to 
operationalize ideas, interests and objectives into usable software (Kunasegaran et al. 
2016). Many international challenges of our time have acquired some kind of digital 
dimension, and their corresponding technologies provide a platform for social, political and 
economic activities that should be understood as acquiring technical significance (Rieder and 
Schäfer, 2008; Rieder, 2016). Ultimately, this also demands that we examine the political 
significance of technicity per se (Simondon 1989; Simondon 2013).  
  
What are the consequences of platforms that organize and systematize human relations, 
information and culture? It is one thing to assess Facebook as a vector of diplomatic 
messages, with embassies creating their pages and engaging with audiences as if Facebook 
is a virtual, simulated facility. Another aspect would be to assess the selfsame politics 
proper to the way in which the platform functions and that can be relevant to foreign policy. 
How does Facebook aggregate its users and the information they share? What is the role of 
algorithms behind the Newsfeed in picking and retrieving posts that belong most to a 
certain political viewpoint? Does Facebook seek to aggregate ideas that are diverse enough 
for users to be exposed to different worldviews, and hence to promote dialogue (Sandvig et 
al., 2014; Bessi et al., 2016)? Why, for example, does Google show European authors who 
are Google Searching for the “Dokdo islands” (that is, the islands contested by South Korea, 
 
 
which calls them Dokdo, and Japan, which refers to the Takeshima Islands) more pages 
originating in Japan (finishing in “.jp”) than in South Korea (Rieder and Sire, 2014; Rieder, 
2009)? These and other issues about the reach into society of digital platforms surface 
naturally in South Korea, with its own internet and digital life, and the export of its 
applications, especially to Southeast Asia.  
  
Digital literacy and awareness in diplomacy 
  
Consumers’ familiarity with, and dependence on, digital and increasingly mobile 
technologies — symbolized by the smartphone — often seems to go hand in hand with a 
lack of critical awareness of how such technologies have started to shape our political life. 
The so-called “digital divide” is not just one between populations that have or lack the 
means to access these technologies, but also a divide between more or less “digitally 
literate” citizens.[v][5] In this perspective,meta-literacy does not appear to be so much of a 
matter of “catching up”. It would be about the individual ability to make an informed 
assessment of the role and impact of digital technologies upon people’s personal lives and 
on politics, and in being able to act with instruments that are attuned to contemporary 
forms of power, such as with software (Rushkoff, 2010). And it would be  a small step from 
the self-awareness of digital citizens and the administrative reality of digital governance to 
the digital manifestations of diplomacy. 
  
One of the problems may be that diplomats still view “digital” as synonymous with 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Google, and the economic and social disruption caused by 
platforms such as Uber and Airbnb. “Digital diplomacy” would then correspond to the use of 
popular software for diplomatic purposes and — at most — relations with the actors 
producing them, with the consequence being that diplomacy “as we know it” is 
superimposed onto digital technologies “as we know them” — that is, as mere tools for 
statecraft that is essentially the same as yesterday. One old-school voice in the debate 
about the impact of digitization on international relations maintains that the nature of the 
“revolution” should not be exaggerated: ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) have dealt with 
earlier technological shifts such as the introduction of the electric telegraph in the 





It is inevitable for MFAs to examine the effects of digitization on their structures and work 
processes. The digitization of foreign operations goes  back to the use of code-breaking 
machines during the Second World War and, later, to the introduction of personal 
computers in the late 1970s, depending on the definition of digital technologies (Maximoff 
and Andréani, 2004). What is going on today may, however, have far-reaching implications 
for governments, as diplomacy is no longer a trade that is taking place in closed spaces. 
MFAs have started thinking about the fundamental implications of digital transformation for 
the physical structures of their headquarters and embassies (Bratton, 2015; Siegert and 
Winthrop-Young, 2015; Parisi, 2013). A real challenge for foreign policy bureaucracies that 
are steeped in centuries of diplomatic tradition is that they lack the intuitive, post-
disciplinary, “native” character of some emerging non-state actors — whether NGOs or 
companies — that are thriving with the investment and management of data (Dann, 2015). 
  
Rather than thinking about “digital” in terms of communication, MFAs may need to invest 
more in how digital technologies can enhance their policymaking capacity. In South Korea, 
this was for instance put into practice in overseas development assistance. Many of the 
policies of South Korea’s International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) have a science, 
technology and innovation component. In the words of one senior South Korean diplomat, 
their tradition in science, technology and innovation  — is “KOICA’s default mode”. This 
governmental agency under the South Korean foreign ministry has emulated the model of 
the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JAICA), and, like Japan, it sets an example 
for the “digital for development” (D4D) approach in other parts of the world, such as the 
European Union (EU). Development as a concept offers the tools and knowledge that 
countries in the Global South may invest in their own policies. This makes KOICA a notable 
and innovative competitor to Western partners in the process of changing their donor-
recipient relationships. The South Korean view is that technologies of any kind are tools to 
strengthen populations, which makes its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) information and 
communication technology for development (ICT4D) approach distinctive. The South Korean 
International Cooperation Agency exports connectivity infrastructures and other machines to 
the Global South, where it also offers its services as an adviser on e-governance (KOICA, 
2014).  It is also a strong card for the South Korean government to play in their competition 









The softwarization of diplomatic practice 
Many practitioners appear to see “digital diplomacy” almost uniquely as an extension of 
public diplomacy. As studies in new media suggest, there is an urgent need to analyse 
digital technologies as mediating political processes, and thus of digital diplomacy as having 
its own “digitally native” forms (Rogers, 2013; Rieder, 2016). The concept of diplomacy as a 
practice with its own “digitally native” forms departs from millennia of pre-digital practice. 
Diplomatic engagement with digital technologies and the utilization of software for 
diplomatic purposes is thus to be based on an understanding of the political significance of 
“digital”. Against the backdrop of breakneck technological developments, and with 
generations entering the diplomatic profession that have a different relationship with data 
than their predecessors, “digitally native” diplomacy is no longer farfetched. Most diplomats 
will not yet see themselves as digital actors, but there are those who already do, and the 
data scientists who are currently entering the ranks of foreign ministries in growing 
numbers are signs of change. New questions abound: how do diplomatic actors regulate 
technologies for their use? How may software and its technical components be utilized for 
diplomatic purposes? How necessary is it for individual diplomats to become familiar with 
the world of technology by being more than simply consumers? What should the diplomat 
know about digital technologies in order to use them effectively? 
  
The relationship between individual diplomats and digital technology can suggest a slightly 
different history than the way in which predecessors have adopted the use of the telephone 
(to call), the typewriter (to write), the telegraph (to send encrypted messages) and the 
personal computer (to write, and store, organize and send information) (Lister, 2009). To 
be sure, the advent of social media has shown entirely new dynamics in the relationship 
between diplomacy and technology. Such services seem to have surfaced almost out of the 
blue and, typically, their rise is seen as being a development outside the world of 
diplomacy. Over the past five years, many MFAs have invested a great deal in catching up 
with the social media phenomenon and have started making use of its potential in more and 
more areas of foreign policy. Following the Arab Spring, a variety of international crises 
between 2011 and 2015 were major learning opportunities for governments (Rieder et al., 
 
 
2015). In a relatively short time span, social media have become indispensable in the 
delivery of key MFA functions such as public diplomacy and assistance to nationals abroad. 
  
Fundamentally new for governments, and unlike previous technological change affecting 
diplomacy, is the fact that society is setting a technological standard to which foreign 
ministries need to adapt (Hocking and Melissen, 2015; Melissen and Caesar-Gordon, 2016). 
Facebook and Twitter are now commonly used in the corridors of diplomacy to gather 
information, communicate ideas, strategize and communicate policies, build relationships, 
manage networks and to crowd-source knowledge (Pamment 2016; Pamment 2013; 
Hayden 2012). The way in which digital technologies are presently used is often 
fundamentally similar to the incorporation of various types of “machines” in nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century diplomatic practice: diplomats use what technology offers and was 
designed to do. Yet, as mentioned before, part of understanding the digital dimensions of 
diplomacy today is to understand what digital technologies comprise (Bjola and Holmes, 
2015, pp. 13–32). Besides platforms, there are different operating systems, websites, apps 
and smaller components such as links, widgets and trackers (for a more detailed description 
of such elements, see Rogers, 2013; Rogers, 2004; and Helmond, 2015). Moreover, behind 
all of these interfaces there is a universe of code, programming languages and the 
algorithms that mechanize them (Manovich, 2001; Manovich, 2013b; Hartley et al., 2013). 
These various layers of digital technologies give us an idea of how much there is to explore 
in the practice of digital diplomacy — and is already being explored by governments, 
although often quietly. 
  
In a world of uneven digital development, we see how, at one end of the spectrum, 
governments are still struggling to get their MFA website updated. At the other end of the 
spectrum, political actors are exploring the benefits of geospatial mapping in international 
crises, or algorithmic diplomacy to penetrate the overseas networks of those holding 
opinions that run against their national interests (see Silva, 2016; and Phil Howard's project 
on political bots: politicalbots.org). One of the most distinguishing characteristics of digital 
technologies is that they are meta-machines: machines that can be used actively and 
creatively to create yet other machines — software (Manovich, 2013b, pp. 107–158). They 
offer ready-to-use products such as computers and other hands-on devices, but they also 
provide the means to create software that is tailored to internal or proactive diplomatic 
needs. Such seems to be the case with what Uber does for transportation, Airbnb for the 
hospitality industry, Google for documentation, YouTube for filmmaking, Spotify for music, 
 
 
and Facebook and Twitter for personal relations, political careers and political activism (for 
more on this, see Yeung, 2016; Bucher, 2013; and Henten and Windekilde, 2016). The 
influence of these platforms resides partly in their organizing and systematizing of digitized 
data and the transnational mediation of content, whether it is in the form of culture, ideas, 
knowledge, relations or capital. Such is the power of the daily bread-and-butter in the 
“walled gardens” of Google (using its PageRank algorithm), Twitter (selling algorithms to 
private-sector clients doing business in personal data with governments), YouTube (the 
second largest engine on the web) and Facebook (claiming digital recognition of contested 
states like Kosovo) (see Morozov, 2015). The mediation capacity of these platforms as 
controlled informational environments is as relevant to the world of diplomacy as it is to the 
commercial sector. 
  
The making of South Korea as a digital diplomacy actor 
Decades of industrialization have turned technology, now digital, into an object that is  
closely associated with South Korea’s national identity. Following in the footsteps of policies 
put into place under the authoritarian rule of President Park Chung-hee (1961–1979), 
successive South Korean governments have made continuous efforts to “modernize” the 
country (Kim, 2014b). Technology soon turned into a totem of nationalization and a good 
that was traded to the rest of the world (Park and Shin, 2005). South Korea is often said to 
have become one of the most “wired” countries in the world. It is no exaggeration to state 
that South Koreans live in an intimate, yet mundane relationship with digital technology. As 
Hye Ryoung Ok observes: “Since its early days, online space in Korea has rarely been 
considered as a purely cyber or virtual space occupied by techno-geeks. Instead, the strong 
connectivity between online and offline reality defines the Internet as an inextricable part of 
techno-culture in Korea” (Ok, 2011, p. 325). 
  
In order to obtain a better understanding of the meaning of “digital” in South Korea and 
how South Korea’s experiences may inform the practices of other parts of the world, 
observers may have to look beyond stereotypes and assumptions that colour the way in 
which they look at Asian actors in international relations (Melissen & Sohn 2015; Yi & 
Melissen 2011). It may, for instance, seem paradoxical that “digital behaviour” can thrive in 
a typical risk-averse government bureaucracy. At the individual level, South Korean 
diplomats often appear to be reluctant about being visible in the global social media domain. 
From an American and European point of view, and by not taking cultural factors into 
 
 
account, this could easily lead to the fallacy of labelling diplomats as “analogue” 
professionals. What may further look like a contradiction in Asian international relations is 
that digital culture coexists with a preference for traditional state-to-state relations and the 
Westphalian notion of noninterference in the internal affairs of neighbouring governments 
(Ibid). 
  
South Korea’s digital presence is often associated with the Hallyu wave of Korean 
entertainment and popular culture, and growing numbers of East Asians have become 
familiar with the digital platforms of Naver, Google’s South Korean competitor, or the Kakao 
Talk messenger app.[vii][7] Popular culture and the popularity of mobile devices add to South 
Korea’s soft power, and its technological strengths are visible in its public diplomacy 
instruments, ranging from digital outreach initiatives such as the Korea Foundation’s Korea 
Clickers to its food app.[viii][8]  Individuals who are curious about South Korea may have 
made direct contact with the country through civil society organizations — often supported 
by MOFA and/or other government agencies in one way or another. Interestingly, the South 
Korean government has managed to carve out a role for itself in mobilising civil society.  
 
The success of the Voluntary Association Network Korea (VANK) is probably the best 
example of a South Korean NGO practising digital people-to-people diplomacy. In fact, this 
volunteer-based civil society initiative is functioning as a sui generis diplomatic organization, 
but VANK has also attracted criticism for hounding opponents online. VANK’s cyber 
diplomats engage with information spread across all major platforms by individuals and they 
correct assumptions about South Korea that are propagated by influential media and other 
established sources of knowledge. An NGO like VANK seems a good fit for the South Korean 
public diplomacy approach that envisages a key role for civil-society actors who are broadly 
aligned with government policy on South Korea, and of course the use of digital media 
across a variety of Asian and Western platforms. But when it comes to engaging foreign 
audiences via digital media, the great majority of Korean social media pages, including the 
online pages of embassies in foreign countries, is in Korean and not in English. 
 
South Korea’s emergence as a digital diplomacy actor can be properly understood against 
the backdrop of the country’s metamorphosis in the second half of the twentieth century 
(Oberdorfer, 2001). South Korea’s transformation was propelled by a deep-seated belief in 
the merits of a close technology–governance nexus (Keller and Samuels, 2003). Successive 
governments took the initiative by giving technology a central place in the social contract 
 
 
between government and people, thus creating a unique social and political relationship 
with newly emerging technologies (Lie and Park, 2006). It is important to understand the 
outline of this legacy and how it has left its mark on the practice of South Korean external 
relations. The use of digital technologies in South Korea has already been the subject of 
research by economists, political scientists and anthropologists, and there are good reasons 
for students of diplomacy to take a closer look at South Korea (Kim and Han, 2005; Khan et 
al., 2014; Hjorth, 2013; Hsu and Park, 2012). 
  
South Korean governments have invested in new technologies as a go for collective 
purposes and societal benefit. After almost 50 years of hardship caused by Japanese 
colonial rule (1910–1945), the Second World War (1937–1945) and the Korean War (1950–
1953), South Korea has almost entirely recreated itself. Technological development was 
much more for the “Korean makeover” than a means to rebuild South Korea’s 
infrastructure. It was a modernizing and innovating force for the South Korean nation (Heo 
and Roehrig, 2010). In this perspective, Korea’s chaebols — the sui generis South Korean 
giant production houses and business conglomerates — can in a way be seen as a means to 
renew national identity (Chung, 2011). As early as the 1970s, the production of 
technologies had become an industry in itself. Successive South Korean governments 
pushed for the economic and civil sectors not only to be aided by technological 
development, but to become “technological” themselves (Yi, 2013). The readjustment of 
public administration and the private sector in South Korea has imitated the horizontal 
structure of private tech companies, and the “creative economy”, an idea promoted by Park 
Geun Hye’s administration, seeks to stimulate the free-flowing problem-solving capacities 
that turned tech companies into new economic powerhouses (OECD, 2015). It does so 
despite a few important drawbacks, as South Korea’s e-governance system remains stuck in 
software updating problems, over-relying on Microsoft PCs and poorly secured browsers 
such as Internet Explorer (Seltzer, 2013; Kim, 2014). 
  
As discussed in the following section, South Korean diplomatic practice did not remain 
unaffected by this transformation. MOFA went through reforms that were aimed at 
integrating technologies as a means of governance, and the whole experience informed 
South Korean foreign policy and diplomacy, to the extent that becoming technological 
became a global South Korean export product (Kim et al., 2011; Lee, 2013; Park and 
Kluver, 2009; Khan et al., 2014). Digital technology — going beyond the export of South 
Korean hardware, software and the kinds of infrastructure that are facilitating their use — 
 
 
has been at the heart of South Korea’s efforts to maximize its global leverage (OECD, 2015; 
Ministry of the Interior, 2014). 
  
Digital culture as South Korea’s diplomatic asset 
How does South Korea apply digital technology to diplomacy? First, MOFA takes an interest 
in extending South Korean influence by exporting communicational infrastructures. Such 
infrastructures may come in the form of broadband landlines and other materials, which are 
meant to allow relatively isolated populations in Central Asia to be more regionally and 
internationally connected. This kind of investment is part of South Korean foreign policy 
strategy. South Korea’s technological credentials, together with its non-threatening middle 
power status, Asian identity, the absence of a history as a colonizing nation and its own 
relatively recent experience as a recipient of foreign aid all make South Korea a potentially 
valuable partner. Governments in the wider Asian region are also looking for South Korean 
support, as was recently demonstrated by Thailand’s request for Seoul’s help in developing 
its “4.0 economic roadmap” (YuGee, 2016). As has been mentioned before, South Korean 
digital strengths extend to the field of official development aid (ODA).   
 
Second, MOFA represents South Korea as an important digital knowledge resource and 
vector of new issues in digital technologies and international relations. This asset makes it 
easier for South Korean diplomats to strengthen bilateral relationships among clubs like the 
G20, OECD, or MIKTA (the informal partnership of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey 
and Australia). One area where South Korea’s expertise is appreciated concerns the 
discussions about internet regulation that have moved higher on the international agenda.  
Negative cyber relations are a given on the Korean peninsula, often in the form of cyber-
attacks or attempts to nullify each other online (Harlan, 2010). Issues such as hate speech 
and respect for each other’s digital boundaries, which are on the agenda of multilateral talks 
on cyberspace, also have their place in South Korea’s relations with its neighbours North 
Korea and China respectively (Hongbo, 2013). But there are also domestic issues. The 
curbing of the freedom of expression and democratic achievements as a result of official use 
of the Public Security Law has attracted criticism in South Korean society and from foreign 
observers. 
  
In recent years, MOFA has gained its share of influence in multilateral talks on cyber norms 
and cyber security, by aiming to give states and international organizations greater agency 
 
 
in a prospective digital world. This has granted South Korea positions of authority in the 
United Nations as a participant in the Governmental Group of Experts, just like in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and its informal dialogues 
within MIKTA (Secretary-General of the United Nations, 2015), although there are abundant 
challenges threatening to erode South Korea’s efforts to influence global regulatory debates 
about cyber (Fidler, 2015). 
  
Third, South Korean society and the economy are pushing the digital standards of 
government upwards, resulting in more and more intuitive use of cultural elements that are 
particular to online spaces by government officials. Another way in which South Korean 
diplomacy is showing awareness of digital culture is by communicating with foreign 
audiences via local platforms, notably with Weibo in China, and observing the way in which 
relevant groups in foreign societies communicate online. This practice is quite common in 
other diplomatic services. The more digitally literate diplomat’s intuition for digital culture 
does, however, resonate in an understanding of what moves and makes culture online 
(Hjorth, 2013; Yoon, 2006). MOFA has made deliberate use of online participatory culture 
as a way of engaging users with South Korea-related web pages. This goes as far as 
nudging people towards South Korean views on policy issues, including controversial topics 
in international politics such as the contested sovereignty of the Dokdo/Senkaku islands 
between South Korea and Japan. 
  
  
Fourth, and in a very practical sense, MOFA benefits directly from state-of-the-art 
technology in the use of software for domestic diplomatic purposes. Besides using US, 
Chinese and its own South Korean platforms to reach different audiences around the globe, 
MOFA’s consular section has secured fruitful partnerships with South Korean corporate 
communication giants SK Telecom, Korea Telecom Freetel and LG Telecom, which cover 
almost 100 percent of the local telecommunications market. For example, South Koreans 
landing at a foreign airport receive a text message giving regularly updated travel advice 
that is tailored to local conditions. Like other foreign ministries, MOFA is constantly updating 
its apps and it is gradually heading for a future where a digitally native population will be a 
condition for greater effectiveness in government services. 
  
Arguably, the South Korean government is better at communicating in Korean and with 
South Koreans at home and abroad than with foreign publics. The domestic dimension of 
 
 
South Korea’s public diplomacy is underpinned by the view that people-to-people diplomacy 
is more effective than government-initiated communication, and that citizens travelling 
overseas are to be educated about the duties of being unofficial diplomats. South Korean 
people-to-people diplomacy is thus society-based, but, significantly, it is indirectly 
government-driven and its participating citizens are organized in age groups (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014). The premise that people agree with the overall approach 
of government can however not be taken for granted in citizen diplomacy. Occasionally 
devoted Korean citizen diplomats have caused embarrassment at home, as when a statue 
reminding of sexual slavery by Japan during the Second World War was put in front of that 
country’s Consulate-General in Busan in 2017.  
  
Conclusions 
In the past five years many foreign ministries have made considerable progress in learning 
the ropes of social media, and there is an understandable interest of governments in 
measuring the effects of their activities in the digital realm. We argue, however, that for 
many diplomats the most important learning, and indeed catching up with the world 
outside, is still to come: it concerns a critical knowledge and use of software and other 
technical, but no less political, elements constituting digital technologies. Research in new 
media studies helps to advance our understanding of diplomatic practice in the digital age 
while, as we have argued, South Korean digital diplomacy is pushing some, not all, of the 
frontiers of practice. The breadth and complexity of digital technologies, the new meanings 
that they bring to the game of international relations, and the uses that countries such as 
South Korea have made of them are all motives for  an exploration of the new digital 
boundaries of diplomatic practice. 
  
What is it that foreign ministries across the world need to do in a field of activity that is fast-
moving but still quite daunting for most practitioners? It would be in their interests to 
embrace conceptions of technology that no longer separate substance from technique, and 
instruments from language. The technical aspects of everything digital are profoundly 
political, as debates about foreign interference in the 2016 and 2017 US and European 
election campaigns have made clear. Diplomats should remain critical of real-life actors 
behind software, of their intentions and of how they pursue their aims, and with what effect. 
It is in their interests to realize that politics happens at the earliest stages of the design of 
software that is used in the context of international relationships. The rather more positive 
 
 
flipside of this is that software can be increasingly created for diplomatic purposes. Not 
doing so would place many foreign ministries at a disadvantage in comparison with more 
astute counterparts and non-governmental actors. From user-friendly interfaces to codes 
and algorithms, it is this design that they need to examine, critique, and improve in the 
interests of enhancing policy capacity.  
 
The new digital instruments that are, in principle, within everybody’s reach are mediums 
that design our access to information, ideas and culture and one’s possibilities to connect 
and relate to others. Critical digital diplomacy is then not so much an active and continuous 
search for attention online, as in a lot of public diplomacy. It constitutes diplomatic 
engagement with how culture, information and relations are systematised in software, such 
as with the counteracting of algorithms that do not work in one’s favour.  Mechanisms 
constituting digital technologies can be actively used as tools to operationalize political and 
diplomatic interests. The challenge for MFAs the world over is thus to explore all this and 
put it into practice. Individual diplomats are in need of the concepts to critique and 
comprehend the digital realm. Their governments would be well advised to make the most 
of their operations in this new environment, in which future diplomacy will increasingly be 
enacted.  
 
MFAs and governments at large are currently pondering what it takes to be effective and 
stay relevant in the digital age. Some of these issues are surprisingly mundane. For South 
Korean government agencies there is for instance an important issue to address: their 
impact as digital diplomatic actors is significantly hampered by the fact that, in spite of all 
technical sophistication and lessons learned from decades of innovation, most online 
communication from Seoul and by overseas embassies, is not in English but in Korean, and 
would benefit from less reluctant engagement with foreign audiences. This is a clear 
argument for more direct engagement with online citizens from other countries, including 
the West. We also feel that South Korea could do a better in promoting Korean platforms of 
potential interest to overseas publics. Just as with the export of South Korean 
entertainment such as K-pop and K-drama, Southeast Asians are among the foreign 







➤ Foreign ministries (MFAs) across the world should embrace conceptions of technology 
that no longer separate substance from technique, and instruments from language. 
 
➤ Diplomats should realize that digital diplomacy constitutes engagement with how culture, 
information and relations are systematised in software, such as with the counteracting of 
algorithms that do not work in one’s favour. 
 
➤ As diplomacy is increasingly enacted in a digital environment, diplomats should be critical 
of real-life actors behind software, of their intentions and how they pursue their aims, and 
with what effect. 
 
➤ MFAs that have the capability to create software for diplomatic purposes but do not yet 
do so, are at a disadvantage in comparison with more astute counterparts and non-
governmental actors. 
 
➤ Mechanisms constituting digital technologies can be used as a medium to operationalize 
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